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SUBJECT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON U.S.-RUSSIA SECURITY  
ISSUES

11. The text below has been approved by the National Security Council for use by Posts in response to press and host government queries regarding the April 1 meeting between President Obama and Russian President Medvedev. Please note that background information should be used only to inform posts and should not be used with press.

## 12. NONPROLIFERATION GOALS

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Background: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Parties meet to review the operation of the Treaty every five years. These meetings are viewed as important reflections of the strength of the NPT and the nonproliferation regime in general. The last such meeting in 2005 was filled with acrimony over key issues such as disarmament, non-compliance, and nonproliferation in the Middle East and failed to reach agreement on a consensus document. Increasing attention is being given to the 2010 Review Conference as a key milestone in the process of repairing and strengthening the regime.

Question: What importance do you attach to the 2010 Review Conference, and what steps will you take in order to avoid a repeat of the failure of the 2005 Review Conference?

-- The United States places the utmost importance on the NPT, which is the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The review process affords Parties the opportunity to examine the operation of the Treaty to help ensure that its purposes and provisions are being realized.

-- We hope that the 2010 RevCon will demonstrate that the Treaty will continue to be an effective legal and political barrier to nuclear proliferation. We will strive for a recommitment by Parties to the objectives of the NPT and to their basic shared interest in preventing proliferation.

-- We will also seek a Conference that helps set a new course in the direction of the greater fulfillment of the vital goals of the Treaty - stemming proliferation, working toward a nuclear weapons-free world, and sharing the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy.

## 1B. DPRK

Background: North Korea has announced its intention to launch an "experimental communications satellite" between April 4-8, 2009. The United States believes that this action would violate UNSCR 1718, which obligates the DPRK to suspend all ballistic missile-related activities and re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launching. On March 27, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin

publicly urged North Korea to "refrain from this launch," and stressed that "there is no need to increase tensions." However, in discussions with us and other Six-Party members Russia has maintained that a peaceful space launch is not expressly forbidden by UNSCR 1718.

Question: What are the United States and Russia doing to prevent a North Korean missile launch?

-- The U.S. is working with our partners, including Russia, to encourage North Korea to refrain from all provocative acts. We appreciate the actions Russia has taken to date urging North Korea to refrain from increasing tensions by conducting a missile launch.

-- Both the U.S. and Russia agree that any launch by the DPRK of a Taepo-Dong 2 (TD-2) or other similar rocket would be a provocative act and would be damaging to peace and stability in the region.

-- The DPRK should refrain from such activities and focus on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner through the Six-Party Talks.

-- Administration will continue to work with Russia, as well as with our other partners, to resume the Six-Party Talks as soon as possible and will seek to coordinate our

STATE 00032299 002 OF 009

efforts to hold North Korea to its commitment to verifiably denuclearize.

#### C. Iran

Background: As a member of the P5+1, Russia is of critical importance in the future direction of our efforts vis-a-vis Iran's nuclear program. Russia has supported, all five resolutions adopted by the UN Security Council (1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, and 1835) and proposed the last resolution as a way of demonstrating the continued unity of the international community in confronting Iranian nuclear policy. Russia will be very interested in the U.S. Administration's policy on Iran and will continue to be included in our decision-making process.

Question: What is your new policy on Iran and how will Russia fit in?

-- United States policy on Iran is still under review, but as the President stated in his March 20 remarks during Nowruz to the Iranian people and leadership, we are committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.

-- The Russian Government will be a key partner in this effort, in the multilateral P5 plus 1 process, bilaterally working with the United States, and through its relationship with Iran. President Obama and his Administration look forward to working with President Medvedev to help resolve this long-standing challenge to international security.

-- We are committed to direct diplomacy, but this does not mean that Iran's violations of its international nuclear obligations cease to have consequences.

-- There are five UN Security Council resolutions that reflect the international community's continuing serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program.

-- We have publicly stated that we want Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations and we mean that. Iran has rights, but with rights come responsibilities.

-- We are prepared to take real steps toward a very different and positive future. But Iran must take steps too. We hope Iran does not miss an opportunity.

#### D. UNSCR 1540

Background: UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) established an obligation for all UN Member States to develop and enforce effective measures to establish domestic controls to prevent WMD proliferation and their means of delivery. The UN's 1540 Committee works to facilitate states' compliance with the Resolution and to report back to the Security Council on progress on its implementation. The U.S. works within and in coordination with the 1540 Committee, sponsoring many 1540 workshops, training events, and assistance programs designed to help all states strengthen their capabilities to prevent WMD proliferation. Russia also sits on the 1540 Committee. Plans are underway for all UN Member States to participate in a Comprehensive Review of UNSCR 1540 implementation at the end of 2009.

Question: What are the U.S. and Russia doing to support UNSCR 1540 implementation?

-- UNSCR 1540 is a vital element in global efforts to prevent the proliferation of WMD and to keep these horrific weapons out of the hands of terrorists.

-- Implementation of UNSCR 1540 by all UN Member States will help ensure that no state or non-state actor is a source or beneficiary of WMD proliferation.

- The U.S. and Russia intend to give new impetus to the implementation of UNSCR 1540. As permanent Member States of the UN Security Council, both our countries work actively to promote and assist with UNSCR 1540 implementation.

E. Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) Background:  
The PSI is an informal and voluntary effort by countries

STATE 00032299 003 OF 009

(currently 94) that have committed to cooperate in halting transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. The Administration wants to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of the PSI. Efforts are underway to broaden participation by all PSI-endorsing states in PSI capacity-building activities (exercises, workshops, training, experts' meetings, etc.). We are also continuing outreach to encourage additional states to endorse the PSI. Russia is a participant in the PSI Operational Experts Group, which meets regularly to plan PSI activities and examine interdiction challenges.

Question: What are President Obama's views on the PSI? Does Russia share those views?

--The President strongly supports the PSI. The Administration's goal is to strengthen and expand the PSI, ensuring that it remains an effective tool in helping responsible governments cooperate to stop WMD proliferation.

-- Russia is an active participant in the PSI, including in the PSI Operational Experts Group, which meets regularly to plan PSI activities and examine interdiction challenges.

#### F. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)

Background: The United States and the Russian Federation both signed the CTBT on September 24, 1996. While the Russian Federation ratified the CTBT on June 30, 2000, the U.S. Senate declined to give its advice and consent by a vote of 48 in favor of ratification and 51 against in 1999. The United States and the Russian Federation are two of the 44 countries required to ratify the Treaty in order for it to enter into force. For CTBT to enter into force, the United States, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Israel must ratify it and India, Pakistan, and the DPRK must both sign and ratify it. In the Secretary's confirmation hearing, she indicated that the Obama Administration would work toward ratification of the Treaty.

Question: Both the Russian Federation and the United States are countries whose ratifications are required for the CTBT to enter into force. The Russian Federation ratified the CTBT in 2000. What plans does the United States have to follow suit?

-- The United States recognizes the importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty as a nonproliferation and disarmament measure.

-- We believe that it is in the U.S. interest to ratify the Treaty. The Administration will work closely with the U.S. Senate to win its advice and consent to ratification of the CTBT.

#### G. Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)

Background: A Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) would ban the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD) briefly held negotiations on an FMCT in 1998, with the objective of producing a verifiable treaty. However, the CD was unable to agree to resume work in the years following. In 2004, the United States, after an internal review, announced its conclusion that an effectively verifiable FMCT was not achievable. In 2006, the United States proposed the negotiation of an FMCT without international verification provisions, and tabled a draft FMCT text and a draft negotiating mandate. Although the principal reason for the continued failure of the CD to move forward on FMCT negotiations may be the belief by some states that they need to continue fissile material production for weapons programs, some other states use the U.S. position against including international verification provisions in an FMCT as a supposed reason for their opposition. During her confirmation hearings, the Secretary of State said that the United States will work to revive negotiations on an effectively verifiable FMCT.

STATE 00032299 004 OF 009

Question: For the past decade, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to begin work on negotiating a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. One obstacle to this has been U.S. insistence on an FMCT without international verification provisions. Will the United States support the negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament?

-- The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT is the top U.S.

priority at the Conference on Disarmament (CD).

-- The United States hopes that its renewed flexibility on this issue will enable negotiations to start soon in Geneva.

-- The United States looks forward to working with the Russian Federation and other CD members to overcome any obstacles preventing the commencement of FMCT negotiations in the CD.

#### IH. Enhancing Nuclear Security/Material Reduction

Background: We are working to develop a joint statement on nuclear security with Russia for presidential announcement this summer. We hope to include nuclear materials security, nuclear security upgrades, HEU minimization and completion of Agreements on Plutonium Disposition and Material Consolidation and Conversion (MCC).

Question: Did you make any progress on efforts to improve the security of nuclear material in Russia?

-- The U.S. and Russia share a vital interest in protecting nuclear materials, and we have made progress in this area.

-- The U.S. and Russia have worked together for many years on nuclear security. Most recently, under the U.S.-Russian Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, at the end of 2008 all Bratislava nuclear security scope work had been completed.

-- As we deepen our partnership in this area, we will announce specific next steps we can take together to improve nuclear security in Russia and worldwide.

#### II. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Background: The United States and Russia have worked cooperatively on developing proposals for reliable access to nuclear fuel (RANF) as a means of providing countries a viable alternative to developing sensitive nuclear technologies. We were both part of a six country concept in 2006 (also involving France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) that proposed to establish a mechanism at the IAEA that could be used in the event that commercial supply arrangements are interrupted for reasons other than nonproliferation obligations, and cannot be restored through normal commercial processes. Both countries have proposed to establish fuel bank mechanisms to support supply assurances. The U.S. is establishing a national fuel reserve with uranium downblended from excess defense material. Russia intends to establish a reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) to be held at Angarsk and released at the direction of the IAEA; specifics are to be presented to the June meeting of the IAEA's Board of Governors. The Russians established in September 2007 the legal basis for an International Uranium Enrichment Center at the Angarsk enrichment plant, selling shares and services to participating countries, including Kazakhstan, Armenia and Ukraine (although these countries would not be involved in plant operations nor have access to the enrichment technology itself). The objective of providing nuclear fuel services so that states have a reliable supply was referenced in the U.S.-Russia Joint Declaration of July 3, 2007 and both countries work together on this topic in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP).

How are Russia and the United States working together to

avoid the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies?

-- The United States and Russia agree that providing reliable access to nuclear fuel is a way to allow

STATE 00032299 005 OF 009

countries to benefit from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of nuclear proliferation through the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies.

-- Our countries have developed complementary programs and are working through the IAEA and other multilateral forums toward this end.

-- We share the goal of having the IAEA Board of Governors begin debate this June on concrete plans for providing reliable access to nuclear fuel, including one for a Russian fuel bank in Angarsk, and hope that mechanisms can be approved in September.

#### 1J. Civil Nuclear Cooperation

Background: The U.S.-Russia Agreement for peaceful nuclear cooperation ("123" Agreement) would, once in force, provide a legal framework to facilitate U.S.-Russian nuclear commerce. It was signed in Moscow on May 6, 2008 and transmitted to Congress for a mandatory 90-day review on May 13, 2008. Congressional consideration of the Agreement was effectively halted in September when President Bush determined, in light of the Russia-Georgia conflict, that a prior Presidential determination regarding the agreement was no longer effective, and therefore a statutory requirement necessary for the agreement to become effective was no longer satisfied. Possible re-submission to Congress is currently under review. We are still considering timing since we want to make certain that resubmission succeeds.

Question: Does the Administration intend to re-submit the U.S.-Russia Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement ("123" Agreement) for Congressional consideration?

-- The Administration seeks to cooperate with Russia on issues that are in our mutual interest, including scientific cooperation, civil nuclear cooperation and efforts to halt and reverse nuclear proliferation.

-- The proposed 123 Agreement, signed at Moscow May 6, 2008, can be an asset to our nonproliferation efforts and beneficial to U.S. industry.

-- The timing of any movement on the Russian 123 will take into account our broader relationship with Russia, including Russia's policy with respect to Iran.

#### 13. ARMS REDUCTION

##### 1A. START and Follow-on Agreement

Background: Media coverage of the meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev in London, and the joint statement by the Presidents, have raised interest worldwide regarding the efforts by the United States and Russia to negotiate a START follow-on agreement. There has also been widespread speculation regarding the level of reductions that would be achieved in the new treaty. Thus far the U.S. and Russia have discussed broad policy objectives that would guide the negotiations. The negotiations will deal with the specific elements of an



agreement, including the level of reductions.

Question: Can you comment on the Joint Statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev regarding the negotiation of a START follow-on agreement?

-- The Presidents agreed that bilateral negotiations would be initiated with the objective of reaching a new, comprehensive, legally binding agreement on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms to replace the START Treaty, which is set to expire on December 5, 2009.

-- The Presidents have instructed that the subject of the new agreement be the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms, that the U.S. and Russia seek to record in the new agreement levels of reductions that will be lower than those in existing arms control agreements, and that

STATE 00032299 006 OF 009

the new agreement include effective verification measures drawn from the experience of the Parties in implementing START.

-- In addition, the Presidents stated that the new agreement should mutually enhance the security of the Parties, and predictability and stability in strategic offensive forces.

-- The Presidents further charged their negotiators to report, by July, on their progress in working out a new agreement.

Question: Is there sufficient time available to negotiate a new follow-on agreement before the START Treaty expires in December?

-- Negotiating a new agreement before December will be a challenge. The Administration is committed to the effort to ensure that an agreement that serves U.S. security interests and enhances stability is achieved by then.

Question: There have been press reports that the Administration may consider going as low as 1000 nuclear warheads. Is this true?

- The Obama Administration is committed to seeking deep, verifiable reductions in all U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. As a first step, the Administration is committed to seeking a legally binding agreement to replace the current START Treaty.

- As long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the United States must maintain a strong deterrent in support of U.S. national security and that of our friends and allies. The Department of Defense is about to initiate a Nuclear Posture Review in accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act that will assess U.S. deterrence needs and recommend strategy, policy and force levels for the coming decade.

Question: When will negotiations begin?

- The Presidents have directed that the talks begin immediately. The U.S. negotiating team will be headed by the Assistant Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Ms. Rose Gottemoeller.

#### 14. DIALOGUE ON EURO-ATLANTIC SECURITY

Background: In June 2008, President Medvedev called for

a  
Legally binding treaty that would restructure Europe's security architecture. In subsequent comments, Russia has called for a high-level meeting to discuss its proposals, but Russian officials have given few details of Russia's concept. Although Moscow insists it does not seek to undermine NATO or replace the CFE Treaty, Russian authorities have not explained how its ideas relate to core European security institutions, such as NATO and OSCE, or agreements on European security, or how Russia's ideas address continuing failures of implementation of agreed commitments (primarily by Russia itself). We believe that any new framework must build upon existing principles, agreements, and institutions, not seek to replace them. Our focus should be to improve implementation of existing commitments. In this regard, Russia's decision not to perform its CFE obligations (we have rejected Russia's claimed right to "suspend" performance) is particularly significant and must be addressed in parallel with broader discussions on Euro-Atlantic security. The OSCE, with its comprehensive concept of security and its inclusive membership, is the most appropriate forum for discussions about ways to improve Euro-Atlantic security, but we are also open to talking with the Russians about their ideas in other appropriate fora, such as the NATO-Russia Council. We would consider a high-level OSCE-wide meeting on Euro-Atlantic security at the appropriate time, but only when there is substance to justify such a meeting.

Question: What is the U.S. response to Russian calls for discussions about a new security architecture for Europe?

-- We welcome discussion of ways to improve Euro-Atlantic security and believe the OSCE, with its inclusive membership, is the right place for such a discussion.

-- Any such discussion should be based on the core principles and values in the Helsinki Final Act, the

STATE 00032299 007 OF 009

Charter of Paris, and the 1999 Charter for European Security. It needs to build on OSCE's comprehensive concept of security, which includes human and economic dimensions, as well as political-military aspects.

-- The aim should be to enhance the effectiveness of existing Euro-Atlantic institutions and agreements, not replace them with new ones.

If raised: What about a Europe-wide Summit?

-- It would not make sense to commit to that sort of undertaking unless we have the substance to justify it. Progress on a range of issues - Euro-Atlantic security, the CFE Treaty, other issues - would be important.

#### 1A. NATO-Russia Council

Background: In 2002, NATO and Russia established the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) - a forum designed for consultation, consensus-building, and cooperation. It was conceived as a greatly enhanced successor to the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, set up under the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act to assuage Russian concerns about the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement. But the NRC never lived up to its potential. Most projects barely developed or were politicized. Russian opposition to NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine, and to U.S. missile defense plans, coupled with Russia's decision not to meet its obligations under the CFE Treaty, further



reduced common ground. Russia's military action in Georgia in August 2008 led Allies to suspend formal high-level meetings of the NRC. On March 5, NATO Foreign Ministers agreed to formally resume the NRC, including at the Ministerial level, after the April Summit. Allies seek to use the NRC as a forum for dialogue, where we agree and disagree, and for cooperation in areas of common interest. Still, Allies are divided regarding Russia's intentions and the value of cooperation. We hope to use the NATO Summit to find a balance for NATO-Russia that advances positive engagement where interests overlap, while remaining realistic about Russia's intentions and defending our principles.

Question: What goals and expectations do you have regarding NATO-Russia re-engagement, as called for by NATO Foreign Ministers?

-- We are determined to use the NATO-Russia relationship to enhance European security by engaging in candid political dialogue, both where we agree and disagree, and through focused cooperation in areas of common interest, such as Afghanistan and counter-terrorism.

-- We encourage Russia and NATO Allies to work together to transform this relationship into a real partnership that can achieve concrete results. Real cooperation between NATO and Russia can contribute significantly to security in Europe and indeed globally.

#### 1B. Russia-Georgia/Geneva Process

Background: The Geneva discussions on Georgia, called for in point six of the August 12, 2008 ceasefire agreement between Russia and Georgia, have been convened four times since October 15, 2008. The talks are co-chaired by the European Union, the United Nations, and the OSCE. In addition to plenary meetings that include the three co-chairs, the U.S., Georgia, and Russia, the discussions also take place within two working groups: one on security and stability, and the other on the return of internally displaced persons and refugees and humanitarian issues. The working groups include plenary members as well as representatives from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. At the last round of Geneva discussions on February 17-18, 2009, the participants of the Security/Stability Working Group reached an agreement calling for the convocation of two Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms to discuss security issues in the former conflict areas. However, since the last round of talks the de facto authorities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia have refused to name representatives to these Mechanisms, while Russia has refused to convene another round of talks prior to June.

STATE 00032299 008 OF 009

Question: What is the status of the Geneva talks on Georgia?

-- We urge the Abkhaz and South Ossetian participants of the Geneva discussions to immediately name representatives to the agreed Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms and call on Russia to encourage them to do so. There can be no excuse for further delay in implementing this agreement. Immediate implementation of this agreement is critical as it will help stabilize the situation on the ground.

-- We call for another round of Geneva discussions as soon as possible (April) to discuss the mandates of the UN and

OSCE, as well as the failure of the parties to implement the Incident Response and Prevention Mechanisms. We seek a peaceful and lasting solution, and agree on the importance of ceasefire commitments and the Geneva process to bringing stability to region.

Question: Do better relations with Russia mean that the United States will back off its support for Georgia and Ukraine, including on NATO enlargement?

-- Our efforts to reset relations with Russia will not come at the expense of our relations with Georgia and Ukraine or at the price of these countries' sovereignty and territorial integrity.

-- As the Vice President stated in his Munich Speech, there are some issues on which we disagree with Russia. For instance, we will never recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states; never acknowledge a Russian sphere of influence; and always support the right of all sovereign states to choose their partners and alliances.

-- We support the territorial integrity of Georgia, and indeed, one of the founding principles of the NATO-Russia Council is support for the territorial integrity of sovereign states. We continue to call on Russia to live up to its ceasefire commitments.

-- Good relations between the United States and Georgia and Ukraine and good relations between the United States and Russia are not mutually exclusive. We need to move away from this kind of zero-sum thinking. The United States can have cooperative and productive relations with Russia as well as with Georgia and Ukraine and with our allies in Europe.

#### 15. MISSILE DEFENSE COOPERATION

Background: The Administration will support MD, but ensure that its development is pragmatic and cost effective. Iran is steadily developing and testing ballistic missiles of increasingly greater ranges, payloads, and sophistication. Senior U.S. officials have said that if the Iranian threat is eliminated, then the driving force behind the U.S. MD deployments to Europe will be removed. Senior Administration officials also have said that the United States hopes to continue to work closely with NATO and Russia on MD in a cooperative and transparent manner, and to develop and deploy MD assets capable of defending the United States, NATO, and Russia. They have also committed to close consultations with Poland and the Czech Republic.

Question: What are the current U.S. plans for missile defense deployments in Europe?

-- The Administration is conducting a missile defense policy review. We will continue to consult closely with the Czech and Polish governments, and our other NATO allies, on U.S. plans.

-- As the United States and our allies together pursue the issue of missile defense in Europe, we will take into account a number of factors: whether the system works, whether it is cost effective, and the nature of the threat from Iran.

-- If, by working with our allies, Russia, and other

countries, we succeed in eliminating the threat, then the driving force behind a missile defense construction in Europe will be removed.

-- We remain ready to consult with our NATO allies, and with Russia, to see if we can develop new cooperative approaches to missile defense that protects all of us.

Question: What effect will the March 26 resignation of the Czech government have on the missile defense agreement with the Czech Republic?

-- It is premature to comment on the impact to our bilateral missile defense cooperation. We will work with any Czech government to continue to strengthen the security of Europe in new ways against new threats.

## 16. COUNTERING NUCLEAR TERRORISM

### 1A. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism

Background: The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, which is co-chaired by the U.S. and Russian Federation, is recognized as a key component of U.S./Russian strategic nuclear security relations both within the USG and internationally. Working together, the U.S. and Russia have mobilized over 70 nations to improve national and regional capabilities to combat nuclear terrorism. The U.S. and Russia often conduct joint demarches to encourage Global Initiative partners to host or participate in Global Initiative events, thus strengthening cooperation and collaboration among partner nations in building and exercising capabilities to combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism. The Netherlands will host the June 2009 Plenary Meeting, where senior level officials will discuss past Global Initiative activity successes and determine future objectives for the Global Initiative.

Question: How does the U.S. envision the Global Initiative being strengthened in 2009-2010, and what role does the U.S. envision Russia, as co-chair to the Global Initiative, to play in strengthening the Global Initiative?

--In keeping with priorities agreed on in 2008 among partners, the U.S. envisions an active partner nation focus on denying terrorist safe havens, preventing terrorist financing, and strengthening nuclear detection and forensics capabilities during the 2009-2010 period.

--The U.S. and Russia also co-chair the Exercise Planning Group, which promotes use of exercises to test capabilities and enhance overall preparedness through a multi-year exercise program.

## 17. ARCHITECTURE OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP:

Background: We are exploring a more structured dialogue with the Russians that goes beyond the more personalized contacts that characterized the Bush Administration engagement with former President Putin. Such a dialogue might approach the institutional relationship we had under the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission. However, we have yet to determine the parameters of this institutional architecture.

Question: You have spoken of a new architecture for the bilateral relationship. What would that look like?

We are looking at a number of options to institutionalize our relationship.

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